Touro Law Review
Volume 11

Number 3

Article 67

1995

Search & Seizure

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Fourth Amendment Commons,
and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons

Recommended Citation
(1995) "Search & Seizure," Touro Law Review: Vol. 11: No. 3, Article 67.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss3/67

This New York State Constitutional Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @
Touro Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

et al.: Search & Seizure

1136

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 11

home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the
steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation
264
by people passing by.

Using these considerations, the Court determined that the
defendant's barn and the area immediately surrounding it were
not within the curtilage, and it was proper to enter upon it.265
The New York Court of Appeals refused to follow the "open
fields" doctrine enumerated in Oliver v. United States,2 6 6 thereby
affording defendants greater protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures under New York law than they receive
under federal law.

FOURTH DEPARTMENT
7

26
People v. LaMendola
(decided November 16, 1994)

The People brought this action to appeal the decision by the
Genesee county court to suppress evidence obtained from pen
269
registers2 6 8 having the capability of monitoring conversations.

In making this determination, the county court retroactively
applied the rule stated in People v. Bialostok,270 holding that pen
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. 466 U.S. at 178-79 (holding that there is no legitimate expectation of
privacy in "open fields").
267. 206 A.D.2d 207, 619 N.Y.S.2d 901 (4th Dep't 1994).
268. A "pen register" is an instrument that "records or decodes electronic
or other impulses that identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on
a telephone line." Id. at 208. 619 N.Y.S.2d at 902. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 705.00 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
269. LaMendola, 206 A.D.2d at 208, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
270. 80 N.Y.2d 738, 610 N.E.2d 374, 594 N.Y.S.2d 701 (1993). In
Bialostok, pen registers were utilized to determine the nature of defendant's
illegal betting. Id. at 742, 610 N.E.2d at 375-76, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 702-03. The
court held that where a pen register has the capacity to monitor telephone
conversations, although malfunctioning, such pen registers will be treated as an
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registers which have the capability of monitoring conversations
can only be authorized by a search warrant. 27 1 The issue on
appeal was "whether the rule enunciated in Bialostok should be
applied retroactively. "272 The Appellate Division, Fourth
Department, held that because there were federal constitutional
concerns invoked in the Bialostok rule, the county court correctly
applied the rule retroactively and, as a result, the evidence in
issue was properly suppressed. 273
A large volume of incoming phone calls were recorded at the
defendant's residency with the use of the pen registers on, and
just prior to, the dates of scheduled football and basketball
games. 2 74 Such phone calls coincided with the times the
defendant told a confidential informant he could place bets for the
various games. 2 75 A search warrant was obtained from a
magistrate judge for the sole purpose of allowing police to
monitor the defendant's telephone through the use of pen
registers. 276 Based upon the information acquired from the pen
registers and an investigator's observations, a search warrant was
obtained. 277 Subsequently, the defendant requested information
as to whether the pen registers, which the police utilized to
record phone numbers from the defendant's phone, also had the
"capability of monitoring conversations." 278 The District
Attorney conceded that although inactive at the time of use, the
pen registers did have the capability to record conversations. 279
The defendant subsequently moved to suppress the evidence
because "no warrant had been issued for the pen registers that
had the capacity to be used as an eavesdropping device." 280 The
eavesdropping device in which a search warrant is required. Id. at 743, 610
N.E.2d at 376, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
271. Id.

272. LaMendola, 206 A.D.2d at 208, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
273. Id. at 210, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
274. Id. at 208, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
275. Id.

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id.
Id. at 209, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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county court, applying the Bialostok rule retroactively, granted
281
defendant's motion to suppress.
Expressing a fear that retroactive use of the Bialostok rule

would "jeopardize many pending investigations," the People
contended that the Bialostok rule should only be applied
prospectively. 2 82 The People also asserted that because no federal
constitutional concerns were expressed in Bialostok, the rule
should be applied only prospectively. 2 83 However, the defendant

argued that the rule is based on federal constitutional concerns

284
and should be applied retroactively.
In determining whether to apply Bialostok retroactively or
prospectively, the LaMendola court had to decide, pursuant to
People v. Mitchell,285 whether the Bialostok rule was based on
federal or state constitutional concerns. 2 86 The New York Court
of Appeals stated in Mitchell that "[i]f no Federal constitutional
principles are involved . . . the question of retroactivity is one of
State law."' 2 87 Under New York law, if a new rule is based
solely on state constitutional concerns, then a court must examine
the three factors set forth in People v. Pepper288 to determine

281. Id. at 208, 619 N.Y.S.2d 902.
282. Id. at 209, 619 N.Y.S.2d 902.
283. Id. at 209, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 902-03.
284. Id. at 209, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
285. 80 N.Y.2d 519, 606 N.E.2d 1381, 591 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1992). In
Mitchell, the court was presented with the question of whether a new rule
pertaining to the questioning of jurors could be applied retroactively. Id. at
525, 606 N.E.2d at 1384, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 993. The court decided that if
federal constitutional concerns were addressed by the rule, the question of
retroactivity would be one of federal law. 1d. at 526, 606 N.E.2d at 1384, 591
N.Y.S.2d at 993. Otherwise, state law would dictate the law on retroactivity.
Id.
286. LaMendola, 206 A.D.2d at 209, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
287. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d at 526, 606 N.E.2d at 1384, 591 N.Y.S.2d at
993.
288. 53 N.Y.2d 213, 423 N.E.2d 366, 440 N.Y.S.2d 889, cert. denied,
454 U.S. 967 (1981). In Pepper, the defendants moved to retroactively apply a
new rule which stated that once an accusatory instrument has been filed, right
to counsel can only be waived in the presence of counsel. 1d. at 217, 423
N.E.2d at 367, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 890. The New York Court of Appeals, basing
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whether such rule should be applied retroactively or
prospectively. 289 However, the LaMendola court noted that if a
new rule encompassed federal constitutional principles, then,
pursuant to Griffith v. Kentucky, 290 such a rule would be applied
retroactively.

29 1

In LaMendola, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department,
agreeing with the county court, held that in Bialostok, "'the issue
of statutory construction... was not based on a violation of the
[state] statute and did not rest solely on State law.' 2 92 The
appellate division concurred with the county court's decision that
Bialostok was based on both state and federal constitutional
concerns against illegal searches and seizures. 293 Thus, pursuant
to Griffith, the appellate division held that the Bialostok rule

should be applied retroactively and thus defendant's motion to
294
suppress was upheld.
The federal bright-line test, as dictated by Griffith, is in
contrast to the factors enunciated in the New York State

its decision on the evaluation of three factors, held that the rule could be
applied retroactively. Id. at 22r-22, 423 N.E.2d at 369, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
289. Id. at 217, 423 N.E.2d at 367, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 890. The three factors
set forth from the Pepper court which are to be considered include: "(1) the
purpose to be served by the new standards, (2) the extent of the reliance by
law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (3) the effect on the
administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." Id.
at 220, 423 N.E.2d at 369, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
290. 479 U.S. 314 (1987). In Griffith, the defendant's appeal claimed that
the prosecutor used race-based peremptory challenges. Id. at 317. The United
States Supreme Court held that the use of peremptory challenges based on race
denied the defendant of equal protection. Id. The Court explained that a new
rule is to be applied retroactively to those cases which are still pending on
direct review or not yet fmal. Id. at 328. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 86 (1986) (holding that racially discriminatory peremptory challenges to
strike black venire persons "denied the protection that a trial by jury is
intended to secure").
291. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328. The court established that a newly formed
rule is to be applied retroactively to all cases pending on direct review. Id.
292. LaMendola, 206 A.D.2d at 209, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 903 (quoting
Bialostok, 80 N.Y.2d at 745, 610 N.Y.2d at 377, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 704).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 210, 619 N.Y.S.2d 903.
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retroactivity test adopted in Pepper for determining whether a
rule is to be applied retroactively. Federal law takes a rigid
approach and inquires only to whether the new rule is grounded
in federal principles and according to federal law. If the new rule
is based on federal constitutional concerns, then it is applied
retroactively without exception. However, New York's rule on
retroactivity takes a more practical approach and inquires not
only to what the purpose of the new rule is, but also as to its
practical effects upon the judicial system and the individuals who
may have relied upon the old rule.
It may be stated, and rightly so, that the factors articulated in
Pepperpresent the possibility that a rule which should be applied
retroactively will not be so applied because of its practical effect
on the administration of justice and the reliance upon it by the
defendants. This is perhaps a weakness, however, it provides a
degree of judicial discretion that is sometimes needed when the
rights of individuals are involved. The functional difference in
the two rules is that the state rule provides a means for
determining the degree of protection a defendant is entitled,
whereas the federal bright-line test relies on the constitutional
guarantees inherent in the Constitution and its amendments.
People v. Saurini295
(decided February 4, 1994)

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress
evidence on the grounds that the warrantless entry onto his
property by deputy sheriffs violated his constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures pursuant to both the
New York State Constitution 296 and the United States

295. 201 A.D.2d 869, 607 N.Y.S.2d 518 (4th Dep't 1994).
296. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. This provision provides in pertinent part:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.... but upon probable cause .... " Id.
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